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Abstract 
We show that firm-specific information is more likely to be incorporated into stock prices when firms have 
stronger shareholder coordination. The premise of our work is that geographic proximity reduces 
communication costs among shareholders, thereby leading to better coordination. The positive coordination-
informativeness relation is driven mainly by shareholder coordination among dedicated and independent 
institutions. We further show that the positive effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker governance 
mechanisms, suggesting that shareholder coordination could serve as a substitute conduit of price discovery. 
Lastly, we propose that shareholder coordination improves stock price informativeness through the channel of 
enhanced voluntary disclosure quality. 
Keywords  
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INTRODUCTION 
A number of studies highlight that equity ownership by institutional investors has explosively increased over the 
last 20 years in the U.S. stock market.[1] In addition, corporate ownership structure has become more dispersed 
in terms of the number and types of institutional investors.[2] Financial theory suggests that when ownership is 
dispersed among many small individual shareholders, corporate governance benefits from the existence of large 
shareholders (e.g., Maug, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986 ) who are often institutions (e.g., Hartzell & Starks, 2003 
; Kahn & Winton, 1998 ). Institutional investors actively engage in the monitoring of self-serving managers, 
acting as a disciplinary mechanism that attenuates agency costs (e.g., Chen, Harford, & Li, 2007; Gillan & Starks, 
2000 ). Past studies on the effectiveness of institutional investors in corporate governance have mostly focused 
on institutions’ information-gathering and analytical abilities (e.g., Ayers, Ramalingegowda, & Yeung, 2011; 
Chhaochharia, Kumar, & Niessen-Ruenzi, 2012), but have largely overlooked the importance of coordination 
among institutional shareholders. Shareholder coordination, if in place, can facilitate the cooperation among the 
institutional investors and thereby enhance monitoring effectiveness by significantly weakening the free-rider 
problem which aggravates agency conflicts (Grossman & Hart, 1980). This notion is supported by survey 
evidence documented by McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2010) showing that 59% of institutional investors 
among respondents consider coordination with other institutional investors as a way to improve monitoring of 
managers. 
In this article, we study the role of shareholder coordination, proxied by geographic proximity among prominent 
shareholders such as institutional investors, in increasing a firm's transparency and in encouraging the 
incorporation of more firm-specific information into stock prices. Monitoring effort and effectiveness is 
intensified through the coordination among shareholders (e.g., Huang, 2013). As a result, managers under 
scrutiny are more likely to disclose timely and quality information to the public. On the one hand, uninformed 
investors drawn by trustworthy public information are more likely to possess ownership and thereby 
incorporate firm-specific information into stock prices. On the other hand, informed investors are more 
incentivized to collect private firm-specific information as the marginal benefits of trading with uninformed 
investors increase. Kyle (1985) demonstrates that private information is incorporated into stock prices through 
trades placed by informed traders. In other words, we hypothesize that the positive impact of shareholder 
coordination on stock price informativeness is achieved through greater corporate disclosure by revealing more 
firm-specific information to the market and encouraging more collection of private information at reduced cost. 
To measure the degree of coordination at the firm level, we calculate the average of the geographic distance 
among institutional investors weighted by ownership. The rationale of our proxy lies in the fact that institutional 
investors are more likely to coordinate their corporate monitoring efforts when potential connections between 
them become more likely with proximity. Social network literature suggests that social networks are more likely 
to develop when there is homophily, i.e. the tendency of individuals to associate and bond with others driven by 
familiarity, often emanating from geographic proximity.[3] Since the weighted average of distance is inversely 
associated with the level of coordination, we multiply it by −1 for convenience sake. Therefore, the coordination 
measure is the inverse of the weighted average of the geographic distance among institutional shareholders 
(hereafter 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶). 
Our baseline results show the positive relation between the shareholder coordination and the stock price 
informativeness, measured as idiosyncratic volatility (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼).[4] Existing literature shows that dedicated (e.g., 
Bushee, 1998) and independent institutional investors (e.g., Brickley, Lease, & Smith, 1988 ) are more active 
monitors[5] than their counter peers (transient and grey institutional investors). We further find that the 
positive relation between coordination and stock price informativeness is driven mainly by the coordination 
among dedicated and independent institutional investors. Our finding supports the notion that coordination 
among active monitors enhances monitoring effectiveness and thereby improves a firm's information 
environment. 
Next, we examine whether there is a complement or substitution effect between shareholder coordination and 
other governance mechanisms that have been shown to be related with stock price informativeness.[6] The 
literature has shown that governance mechanisms such as antitakeover provisions (Ferreira & Laux, 2007), 
board gender diversity (Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng, 2011), and blockholder ownership (Brockman & Yan, 2009) are 
significantly positively related to price informativeness. Our results show that the impact of shareholder 
coordination on price informativeness is more pronounced in firms with weaker alternative governance 
mechanisms. More specifically, firms with more antitakeover provisions, poison pill provision, low board gender 
diversity, and low blockholder ownership exhibit more significant and stronger coordination-informativeness 
relation, suggesting that shareholder coordination acts as a substitute for other existing governance 
mechanisms. 
Although our findings indicate that shareholder coordination improves stock price informativeness, it is plausible 
that some visible and invisible omitted variables could drive our results. For example, our coordination variable 
could merely capture the same effect of local ownership on corporate disclosure quality. Meanwhile, the 
invisible time-invariant factors such as corporate culture could also explain our results, simply because firms 
with ethical culture are more likely to deliver reliable information to investors. Therefore, to mitigate the 
omitted variable concern, we take the following steps: (1) we include in our results the model specification with 
firm fixed effects that absorbs the effects of time-invariant factors; and (2) we control for more variables such as 
ownership of different types of institutional investors, board characteristics, and managerial ownership in our 
regressions. Our baseline results continue to hold after controlling for these variables. Another explanation for 
our finding is that shareholders that are geographically clustered simultaneously invest in stocks that display a 
high level of stock price informativeness, leading to strong shareholder coordination. To address the reverse 
causality issue, we conduct three additional analyses: lead-lag analysis, change-on-change analysis, and GMM 
analysis. The results confirm that shareholder coordination leads to informative stock prices, but not vice versa. 
Finally, we explore the potential mechanism through which shareholder coordination improves stock price 
informativeness. We focus on examining whether shareholder coordination enhances corporate voluntary 
disclosure. It is well established in the literature that corporate voluntary disclosure can improve price 
informativeness. For example, Haggard, Martin, and Pereira (2008) uncover a positive relation between 
corporate voluntary disclosure and price informativeness. Drawing from the literature (e.g., Ajinkya, Bhojraj, & 
Sengupta, (2005) ; Bamber & Cheon, 1998; Lennox & Park, 2006), we use the frequency of management 
earnings forecasts to capture the extent of voluntary disclosure. We find that shareholder coordination has a 
positive impact on the frequency of management earnings forecasts. Moreover, the positive relation is primarily 
driven by firms with large size, indicating that shareholder coordination affects voluntary disclosure differently 
for firms of different sizes. Further, after including management earnings forecasts, the coordination-
informativeness relation still holds, but is more pronounced in small firms. Taken together, our results imply that 
for large firms, shareholder coordination enhances price informativeness mainly by inducing managers to 
increase value-relevant voluntary disclosures, whereas for small firms, shareholder coordination affects price 
informativeness by facilitating price information collection and incorporation. To further bolster our findings in 
channel tests, we provide additional evidence by showing that shareholder coordination also positively affects 
two alternative measures of voluntary disclosure (management forecast occurrence and forecast precision). 
Overall, our results suggest that shareholder coordination affects price informativeness through enhancing 
corporate disclosure quality. 
The contribution of our study is threefold. Firstly, we extend the literature that has provided mixed evidence on 
the relation between governance mechanisms and stock price informativeness. For example, Ferreira and Laux 
(2007) find that firms with fewer antitakeover provisions display higher levels of price informativeness. 
Brockman and Yan (2009) find that blockholders increase the probability of informed trading and 
idiosyncratic volatility. Gul et al. (2011) find that stock prices of firms with gender-diverse boards reflect more 
firm-specific information. Conversely, Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2011) find a negative relation between 
price informativeness and board independence, suggesting a substitution effect between board independence 
and price informativeness. Our paper makes an important contribution to the literature by documenting that 
shareholder coordination, serving as an internal governance mechanism, is positively associated with stock price 
informativeness. 
Secondly, there is also an ongoing debate about whether more corporate transparency leads to greater stock 
price informativeness. While the conventional wisdom is that corporate transparency facilitates more firm-
specific information incorporation into stock prices (e.g., Gelb & Zarowin, (2002), Dasgupta, Gan, and Gao (2010) 
theoretically and empirically show that stock price informativeness can decrease when corporate transparency 
improves. Our paper makes an important contribution to the ongoing debate by demonstrating that corporate 
transparency driven by shareholder coordination is positively associated with the incorporation of firm-specific 
information into stock prices. 
Thirdly, our study also adds to the literature on the role of geographic proximity in information gathering and 
effective monitoring. Prior literature has documented that geographic proximity between firms and 
shareholders facilitates private information collection and monitoring effort (e.g., Ayers et al., 2011; 
Chhaochharia et al., 2012). Our findings extend the literature by showing that geographic proximity between a 
firm's institutional investors can not only improve institutions’ monitoring effectiveness but also corporate 
transparency, and therefore it can have important implications for market efficiency. It is also noteworthy that 
our paper is different from Huang (2013) in that we focus on investigating whether the degree of shareholder 
coordination can affect a firm's transparency and thereby encourage the incorporation of more firm-specific 
information into stock prices, whereas the goal of Huang (2013) is to determine whether shareholder 
coordination affects firm value. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section describes the sample, measurement of variables, 
and summary statistics. Section contains empirical results. Section provides robustness checks. Section discusses 
a possible mechanism. Second 6 includes concluding remarks. 
SAMPLE SELECTION, VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION, AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Sample selection 
We draw data from the Center for Research in Stock Prices (CRSP), Compustat, Thomson Reuters F13 
Institutional Holdings, Execucomp and I/B/E/S databases. We place two filters to obtain the final sample: (1) to 
alleviate market microstructure-related concerns, we focus on S&P 1500 firms; (2) financial firms (SIC 6000–
6999) and utilities (SIC 4900–4999) are excluded from the sample because their capital market behaviors are 
fundamentally different from that of other firms due to regulation and the financial nature of their operations. 
Our final sample includes 19,028 firm-year observations for the period from 1994 to 2010. The institutional 
investor classification data is from Brian Bushee's website (http://0-
acct.wharton.upenn.edu.libus.csd.mu.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html).[7] We also augment our sample with 
corporate board data extracted from Compact Disclosure and IRRC and management earnings forecast data 




To measure geographic proximity among institutional shareholders, we first identify the location of institutions 
by collecting their headquarters’ zip code from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) documents (SEC 
Edgar). We obtain the latitude and longitude for each of the zip codes from the U.S. Census Bureau's Gazetteer 
Place and Zip Code Database. Following prior research (e.g., Coval & Moskowitz, 2001), we calculate the 
distance between institution 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 using the following standard formula:  
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗  =  𝑟𝑟 ×  arcos{cos(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖)cos(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖)cost�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗�cos �𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗�+
cos (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖)sin(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) cos�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗�sin�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗�+ sin (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) sin(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗), (1) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 is distance in statutory miles, 𝑟𝑟 denotes the radius of the Earth (approximately 3,963 statutory miles), 
and 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 and 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 are latitudes and longitudes of institution headquarters. 
For each firm-quarter and institutional investor in the firm, we first calculate the geographic distance between 
the institution and all other institutional investors in the firm, weighted by their respective fractional holdings of 
the total institutional ownership in the firm. We then take the product of −1 with the logarithm‐transformed 
fractional holdings weighted-average of these distances across all institutional shareholders of the firm to obtain 
the geographic-proximity-based shareholder coordination measure for each firm-quarter.[8] The weighting 
scheme delivers a more accurate gauge of coordination than the simple average of the distances among 
institutions, because it accounts for the fact that institutions with large shareholdings typically have a more 
substantial impact on corporate governance. Specifically, the geographic-proximity-based shareholder 
coordination measure is designed as follows:  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =  −𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿 (1 + ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜖𝜖𝜖𝜖    ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝜖𝜖𝜖𝜖 ), (2) 
where 𝛼𝛼 is the set of institutional investors, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is the ownership weight of institution 𝑖𝑖 in the total ownership 
held by all institutions in a firm at the end of each quarter, and 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖.𝑗𝑗 is the geographic distance between 
institution 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗. The logarithm transformation, log (1 + weighted-average of geographic distance between 
institutions) serves the purpose of reducing the skewness of this variable's distribution. 
Stock price informativeness 
We use idiosyncratic volatility (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) and probability of informed trading (PIN) as our proxies for stock price 
informativeness. French and Roll (1986) and Roll (1988) state that idiosyncratic volatility, defined as stock return 
variation unexplained by market movements, measures the rate of firm-specific information impounded into 
stock prices. Previous empirical studies support the view that idiosyncratic volatility measures the rate of 
information flow into stock prices. For instance, Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003) show that the stock 
prices of firms with more idiosyncratic volatility embed more information about future earnings. Idiosyncratic 
volatility is also commonly used in empirical studies to proxy for the informativeness of stock prices (e.g., 
Ferreira & Laux, 2007; Ferreira et al., 2011). 
We estimate annual firm-specific idiosyncratic volatility by regressing stock returns on the three Fama-French 
model factors. For each firm‐year, firm‐specific return variation is estimated by 1 − 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2  from the regression: 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  −  𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓  =  𝛽𝛽0  +  𝛽𝛽1�𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚  −  𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓�  +  𝛽𝛽2𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑡𝑡  +  𝛽𝛽3𝑯𝑯𝑺𝑺𝑯𝑯𝑡𝑡  +  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , (3) 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the return of stock 𝑖𝑖 in day 𝑙𝑙, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓is the risk-free rate of return in day 𝑙𝑙, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 is the value-weighted 
market return, SMB (small minus big) is the difference between the daily returns of the small and big of a firm's 
portfolios, and HML (high minus low) is the difference between the daily returns of high book-to-market and low 
book-to-market of a firm's portfolios. Since 1 − 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2  is skewed, we take the logistic transformation of 1 − 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2  to 
ensure greater resemblance to a normal distribution. Formally, idiosyncratic volatility 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is defined as: 
Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics. The mean value of idiosyncratic volatility (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) is 1.329 with a standard 
deviation of 1.397. The mean value of 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃 is 0.149 with a standard deviation of 0.074. Both variables exhibit 
similar descriptive statistics as those in Ferreira and Laux (2007). The average geographic-proximity-based 
shareholder coordination (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) is −6.480. Our coordination measure exhibits a fair degree of cross‐sectional 
variation across our sample firms. Table 1 also presents summary statistics for other control variables. In 
particular, institutional shareholders, on average, own 64.5% of the outstanding shares of the average firm. 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Min. Max. 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 19,028 −6.480 −6.551 0.504 −23.600 −0.071 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 19,028 −6.109 −6.169 0.622 −23.034 0.000 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺 19,028 −5.038 −5.075 1.022 −20.717 0.000 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 19,028 −5.139 −5.195 1.083 −20.763 0.000 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 19,028 −5.778 −5.926 1.564 −17.817 0.000 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 19,028 1.329 1.168 1.397 −1.097 7.527 
𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 19,028 0.645 0.675 0.211 0.008 0.964 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴 ($ 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) 19,028 4277.700 858.870 13336.990 3.432 275644.000 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀) 19,028 0.956 0.906 0.751 −1.172 3.323 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 19,028 0.073 0.116 0.440 −4.383 2.433 
𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆. (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸) 19,028 0.290 0.067 1.103 0.007 14.137 
𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 19,028 0.197 0.181 0.173 0.000 2.616 
𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 19,028 29.668 25.000 16.179 3.000 62.000 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 19,028 0.490 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 19,028 0.935 1.000 0.247 0.000 1.000 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) 19,028 1.861 1.878 0.116 1.015 2.127 
𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙 19,028 11.594 9.000 9.132 0.000 62.000 
𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙 19,028 172.156 119.000 170.263 11.000 957.000 
𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 19,028 0.440 0.455 0.181 0.030 0.807 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 19,028 0.053 0.015 0.082 0.000 0.891 
𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 19,028 0.425 0.429 0.184 0.024 0.815 
𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒 12,836 9.012 9.000 2.404 1.000 22.000 
𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 12,836 0.668 0.700 0.174 0.000 1.000 
𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 12,836 0.089 0.091 0.093 0.000 1.000 
𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 11,589 0.031 0.005 0.072 0.000 1.593 
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃 19,028 0.149 0.135 0.074 0.000 1.000 
𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 19,028 1.310 0.000 2.190 0.000 9.000 
𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟 19,028 0.926 1.000 0.261 0.000 1.000 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 19,028 0.372 0.000 0.483 0.000 1.000 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 19,028 0.189 0.000 0.391 0.000 1.000 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟 18,300 0.012 0.006 0.048 0.000 4.105 
𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴_𝐶𝐶 19,028 0.570 1.000 0.495 0.000 1.000 
𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 16,747 0.361 0.163 0.669 0.012 4.893 
𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 19,028 1.073 1.002 0.567 −1.157 4.440 
𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 19,028 0.654 1.000 0.476 0.000 1.000 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics of our sample firms. Please refer to Appendix A for variable 
definitions. 
 
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix. The stock price informativeness measures, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 and 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃, are positively and 
significantly correlated with each other. The correlations between shareholder coordination and both stock 
price informativeness measures are positive and significant, consistent with our prediction that firms with a 
higher degree of shareholder coordination are associated with more informative stock prices. 
 
  
Table 2 Correlation matrix   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 1.000 
            
(2) 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 0.127 1.000 
           
(3) 𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 −0.439 −0.178 1.000 
          
(4) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴) −0.549 −0.155 0.340 1.000 
         
(5) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀) −0.176 −0.176 −0.031 −0.010 1.000 
        
(6) 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 −0.127 −0.100 0.110 0.139 0.167 1.000 
       
(7) 𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆. (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸) 0.061 0.034 −0.087 −0.081 0.182 −0.155 1.000 
      
(8) 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 0.012 0.007 0.048 0.319 −0.079 −0.043 0.081 1.000 
     
(9) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒) − 0.266 0.044 0.168 0.464 −0.145 0.083 −0.081 0.134 1.000 
    
(10) 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 −0.120 −0.005 −0.029 0.348 −0.022 0.117 −0.091 0.162 0.459 1.000 
   
(11) 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 0.129 −0.010 −0.045 −0.158 −0.006 −0.031 −0.009 −0.069 −0.099 −0.054 1.000 
  
(12) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) −0.040 −0.066 0.015 −0.068 −0.007 −0.037 −0.003 −0.032 −0.141 −0.123 0.009 1.000 
 
(13) 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙) −0.389 −0.215 0.205 0.587 0.277 0.101 −0.057 0.028 0.066 0.061 −0.036 0.080 1.000 
Note: This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients under the null hypothesis of no correlation between variables employed. Values in bold type 
have a p-value less than 5%. 
  
EMPIRICAL REGRESSION MODELS AND RESULTS 
In this section, we establish our baseline model and provide regression evidence on the relation between 
shareholder coordination and stock price informativeness. 
Impact of shareholder coordination on stock price informativeness 
Empirical design: baseline model 
We estimate the following baseline empirical model to analyze the relation between shareholder coordination 
and stock price informativeness. 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  =  𝛽𝛽0  +  𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛽𝛽3𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +
 𝛽𝛽4𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛽𝛽5𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛽𝛽6𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆. (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +
 𝛽𝛽8𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛽𝛽9𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛽𝛽10𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +
 𝛽𝛽11𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  + 𝛽𝛽12𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗  +  𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , (5) 
 
where 𝑖𝑖 indexes firm, 𝑗𝑗 indexes industry, and 𝑙𝑙 indexes year. Industry/firm and year indicators are denoted by 
𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 and 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡, respectively. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the geographic-proximity-based shareholder coordination measures for firm 𝑖𝑖 
at year 𝑙𝑙 − 1. We include a number of control variables drawn from the literature on price informativeness. 
These control variables include institutional ownership (𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙), natural logarithm of total assets 
(𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴)), natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio (𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)), firm profitability (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸), profits volatility 
(𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆. (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸)), leverage (𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒), natural logarithm of firm age (𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒)), a dividend payer dummy 
(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚), an internal diversification dummy (𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿), the weighted average distance between institutions 
and a firm's headquarters (𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)) and the natural logarithm of number of analysts following the firm in a 
year (Analyst). Year dummies are included to account for pervasive macroeconomic factors that could affect the 
cross-section of firms, and industry or firm dummies are included to control for the unobservable industry or 
firm characteristics that could drive our results. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level to control for time 
series dependence within the firm that could bias the statistics, as suggested in Petersen (2009) and Thompson 
(2011). 
Regression results 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 present the baseline regression results on the relation between shareholder 
coordination and idiosyncratic volatility 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 estimated from equation (3). Column (1) controls for industry fixed 
effects. To alleviate the problem of omitted variables that could drive our results, we control for firm fixed 
effects in column (2). Both specifications deliver consistent results: shareholder coordination is positively and 
significantly correlated with idiosyncratic volatility 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼. Specifically, the coefficient estimate on 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 in column 
(1) ((2)) is 0.106 (0.067) with a 𝑙𝑙-statistic of 4.34 (2.65). Our results are also economically significant. A one-
standard-deviation increase in 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 increases 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 by nearly 5% in the case of the specification shown in 
column (1) and 3% for the one shown in column (2). 





𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 0.106*** 0.067***  
(4.34) (2.65) 
𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 −0.569*** −0.837***  
(− 9.11) (− 9.46) 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴)𝑡𝑡−1 −0.344*** −0.265***  
(− 27.37) (− 9.91) 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡−1 −0.419*** −0.423***  
(− 24.45) (− 22.44) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 −0.035* −0.072***  
(− 1.65) (− 3.16) 
𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆. (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸)𝑡𝑡−1 0.055*** 0.058***  
(5.87) (5.69) 
𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 0.939*** 0.712***  
(13.76) (8.17) 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒)𝑡𝑡−1 −0.032* 0.064  
(− 1.65) (0.99) 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡−1 −0.038 −0.009  
(− 1.46) (− 0.25) 
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 −0.015 −0.046  
(− 0.38) (− 0.96) 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡−1 −0.179* −0.293  
(− 1.66) (− 0.67) 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙)𝑡𝑡−1 −0.177*** −0.096***  
(− 9.48) (− 4.72) 
Constant 6.796*** 6.100***  
(23.76) (7.26) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes No 
Firm FE No Yes 
Observations 19,028 19,028 
Adj. R2 0.646 0.765 
Notes: This table presents results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is a proxy for stock price 
informativeness; 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is relative idiosyncratic risk measured as Ln([1 − 𝐶𝐶2]/𝐶𝐶2). 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the weighted average 
distances among institutional shareholders and multiplied by −1. Detailed definitions of other variables are listed 
in Appendix A. Industry (i.e., the first two-digit SIC code), firm, and year dummies are included, but coefficient 
estimates are omitted to save space. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standard errors 
adjusted by heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate a two-tailed test 
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
One noteworthy finding in Table 3 is the negative effect of institutional ownership (𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙) on price 
informativeness (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼). At first glance, this result may appear counterintuitive given the evidence documented in 
the literature that institutional investors promote corporate governance and information transparency. 
However, Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) argue that although institutional investors could potentially increase 
the access to firm-specific information by effective monitoring, they may also facilitate information transfer 
across different firms within their investment portfolios, leading to more stock price synchronicity. Our finding is 
consistent with the latter argument. The negative relation between firm size (𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴)) and price 
informativeness (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) is consistent with the finding in Ferreira and Laux (2007). 
Impact of shareholder coordination on stock price informativeness: the role of different 
... 
Existing literature shows that different types of shareholders may differ in their incentives and abilities to play a 
governance role. Therefore, it is also possible that the strength of shareholder coordination might vary 
depending on the type of institutions involved. To investigate this issue, we first follow Brickley et al. (1988) and 
classify institutions into independent and grey institutions according to their potential for having business ties to 
the firm. Independent institutions include mutual funds and investment advisory firms, which are likely to have 
fewer potential business relationships with the corporations in which they invest. Grey institutions include bank 
trusts, insurance companies, and other institutions, which have current or prospective business relationships 
with corporations in which they invest. We then construct separate shareholder coordination measures among 
independent and grey institutions, respectively. We expect that stronger coordination is more likely to develop 
among institutions not subject to conflicts of interest or legal constraints associated with having a business 
relationship with the firm. Accordingly, we predict that the effect of shareholder coordination on stock price 
informativeness should be driven mainly by independent institutions. The results shown in columns (1) and (3) in 
Table 4 are consistent with our expectation: coordination among independent institutional investors is the main 
driver of our findings. Moreover, in Table 4, the coefficient equality tests between coordination among 
independent institutions (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) and coordination among grey institutions (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺) further confirm 
that coordinated independent institutions play a more important role in enhancing the informativeness of stock 
prices. 
Table 4 Baseline regression: by institution type  
(1) (2) (3) (4)  
𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒕𝒕 












































Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes No No 
Firm FE No No Yes Yes 
Observations 19,028 19,028 19,028 19,028 
Adj. R2 0.645 0.645 0.765 0.765 
Notes: This table presents results of OLS regressions using geographic proximity partitioned by types of 
institutional shareholders. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is relative idiosyncratic risk measured as Ln([1 − 𝐶𝐶2]/𝐶𝐶2). 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 and 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺 are the weighted average distances among independent and grey institutional shareholders and 
multiplied by −1, respectively. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 are the weighted average distances among 
dedicated and transient institutional shareholders and multiplied by −1, respectively. Detailed definitions of 
other variables are listed in Appendix A. Industry, firm, year dummies and other firm-level controls used in 
Table 3 are included, but coefficient estimates are omitted to save space. Numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics calculated using standard errors adjusted by heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. 𝑃𝑃-
values of coefficient equality tests are given in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate a two-tailed test 
significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Second, following Bushee (2001), we classify institutions into dedicated and transient institutions. Dedicated 
institutions’ investments are associated with low turnover, low diversification, and a long investment horizon. 
Therefore, dedicated institutions are more likely to play an important role in corporate monitoring and to be 
proponents of a better informational environment for the firms in which they invest. Transient institutions, 
which are characterized by high turnover, high diversification, and a short investment horizon, are less likely to 
engage in corporate governance and less likely to espouse the view that benefits from an improved information 
environment significantly outweigh the costs associated with promoting informativeness. 
Columns (2) and (4) of Table 4 present the results of the regressions that include shareholder coordination 
measures among dedicated and transient institutions. Consistent with the notion that dedicated institutions are 
more effective monitors and promoters of a transparent information environment of firms they invest in, we 
find that only coordination among dedicated institutions has a significant positive impact on stock price 
informativeness. It is noteworthy that coordination among transient institutions exhibits either a significant 
negative or an insignificant effect on stock price informativeness. The coefficient equality tests in Table 4 
provide further support to the notion that coordination among dedicated institutions (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) is more 
effective at promoting stock price informativeness than transient institutions (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇). 
To summarize, we find that stock price informativeness varies with shareholder coordination by different 
institution types in systematic ways that are consistent with the view that a higher degree of shareholder 
coordination encourages the collection and incorporation of private information, and thereby leads to more 
informative stock prices. 
Subsample analysis 
To explore whether shareholder coordination is a substitute or complement of alternative corporate governance 
mechanisms, we employ subsample analysis in this subsection. Literature has shown that a variety of 
governance mechanisms are significantly positively related to price informativeness. For example, Ferreira and 
Laux (2007) find that firms with fewer antitakeover provisions display a higher level of price informativeness. 
Brockman and Yan (2009) find that blockholders increase the probability of informed trading and 
idiosyncratic volatility. Gul et al. (2011) find that stock prices of firms with gender-diverse boards reflect more 
firm-specific information. More specifically, we examine the effect of shareholder coordination on price 
informativeness in subsamples classified by governance index, poison pill provision, board gender diversity, and 
blockholder ownership. 
We first hypothesize that shareholder coordination exerts a more significant influence on price informativeness 
when a firm has more antitakeover provisions or poison pill provision. To test our hypothesis, we first divide the 
sample into two groups on the basis of the median value of governance index (G-index). Then we run the 
baseline model for each subsample. The results in Panel A of Table 5 provide evidence in support of our 
hypothesis. The 𝐼𝐼-value of 𝑙𝑙-statistics for cross-equation coefficient tests further corroborates our findings that 
shareholder coordination is more effective when corporate governance is weaker. We obtain consistent results 
when we divide sample firms by the presence of poison pill provision. The results in Panel B of Table 5 indicate 
that the coordination-informativeness relation is stronger when firms have the poison pill provision. 
Table 5 Sub-sample analysis  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Corporate Governance 
(Gindex) 
    
 
Weak Strong Weak Strong 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 0.138*** −0.008 0.133** −0.005  
(2.63) (− 0.23) (2.10) (− 0.12)  
𝐷𝐷0: 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊 =  𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿 𝐷𝐷0: 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊 =  𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿 
  
 
[< 0.01] [< 0.01] 
  
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE & Industry FE Yes Yes No No 
Year FE & Firm FE No No Yes Yes 
Observations 4,455 6,159 4,455 6,159 
Adj. R2 0.601 0.603 0.726 0.720 
Panel B: Poison Pill Provision      
Yes No Yes No 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−1  0.139** −0.024 0.195* 0.034  
(2.02) (− 0.84) (1.90) (0.72)  
𝐷𝐷0: 𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴 =  𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 𝐷𝐷0: 𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴 =  𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 
  
 
[< 0.01] [< 0.01] 
  
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE & Industry FE Yes Yes No No 
Year FE & Firm FE No No Yes Yes 
Observations 7,005 3,609 7,005 3,609 
Adj. R2 0.619 0.593 0.748 0.735 
Panel C: Female Board 
    
 
High Low High Low 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 0.031 0.126*** 0.008 0.088***  
(0.82) (4.54) (0.19) (2.70)  
𝐷𝐷0: 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ =  𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤 𝐷𝐷0: 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ =  𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤 
  
 
[< 0.01] [0.02] 
  
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE & Industry FE Yes Yes No No 
Year FE & Firm FE No No Yes Yes 
Observations 6,209 6,627 6,209 6,627 
Adj. R2 0.604 0.610 0.776 0.789 
Panel D: Blockholder Ownership 
    
 
High Low High Low 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 0.123** 0.299*** 0.046 0.166**  
(2.44) (5.37) (0.66) (2.29)  





Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE & Industry FE Yes Yes No No 
Year FE & Firm FE No No Yes Yes 
Observations 5,754 5,817 5,754 5,817 
Adj. R2 0.565 0.619 0.685 0.743 
Notes: This table presents results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the proxy for stock price 
informativeness, IV. IV is relative idiosyncratic risk measured as Ln([1 − 𝐶𝐶2]/𝐶𝐶2). 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the weighted 
average distances among institutional shareholders and multiplied by −1. In Panel A, we divide sample firms into 
weak and strong groups of corporate governance (G-index). The high (or low) group is defined as firms with G-
index greater (or less) than its median value. In Panel B, we divide sample firms into groups with and without 
poison pill provision. In Panel C, we divide sample firms into high and low groups of female directors. The high 
(or low) group is defined as firms with the percentage of female directors greater (or less) than its median value. 
In Panel D, we divide sample firms into high and low groups of blockholder ownership. The high (or low) group is 
defined as firms with blockholder ownership above (or below) the median value. Detailed definitions of other 
variables are listed in Appendix A. Industry, firm, year dummies and other firm characteristics used in Table 3 are 
included, but coefficient estimates are omitted to save space. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated 
using standard errors adjusted by heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. 𝑃𝑃-values of coefficient 
equality tests are given in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively. 
 
Given the findings in Gul et al. (2011), similarly, we hypothesize that shareholder coordination plays a substitute 
role when coexisting with the price discovery channel of board gender diversity. In other words, the effect of 
shareholder coordination becomes stronger when a firm's board is less gender-diverse. Panel C of Table 5 
reports supportive evidence. The 𝐼𝐼-value of 𝑙𝑙-statistics for cross-equation coefficient tests support the notion 
that shareholder coordination is a substitute for the alternative information generating mechanism (board 
gender diversity). 
Last, we explore whether there is indeed a substitution effect between shareholder coordination and 
blockholders. We then divide the sample on the basis of median value of blockholder ownership. Our results in 
Panel D of Table 5 show that the impact of shareholder coordination on price informativeness is stronger 
(weaker) in the subsample where blockholders have a weaker (stronger) presence. Therefore, this finding 
continues to support the substitute effect between shareholder coordination and the alternative governance 
mechanism (blockholders). 
In short, our results generally support the notion that the impact of shareholder coordination on price 
informativeness is more significant when an alternative governance mechanism is weak. 
Omitted variables 
To mitigate the concern that our results are driven by omitted variables such as board characteristics and 
managerial ownership, we add a variety of variables to our baseline model. Gul et al. (2011) find that board 
gender diversity improves stock price informativeness. Ferreira et al. (2011) find that board structure and stock 
price informativeness are related. Han, Jin, Kang, and Lobo (2014) find that managerial ownership is positively 
associated with the quality of analyst reporting. Ferreira and Laux (2007) find a positive relation between 
corporate governance and information flow. Therefore, we control board size (𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒)), independent 
board (𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆), board gender diversity (𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆), managerial ownership (𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙) and 
governance index (𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺) to augment our baseline regression model. The results are reported in columns (1)–
(4) and (7)–(10) of Table 6.  
Table 6 Additional controls  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)  





           
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.149*** 0.186*** 0.100* 0.129** 0.075* 0.075* 0.075* 0.088 0.047 0.061  
(3.92) (3.92) (3.95) (4.11) (1.84) (2.16) (1.76) (1.77) (1.76) (1.46) (0.64) (0.72) 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒)𝑡𝑡−1 0.128** 0.128** 0.118** 0.177*** 0.143 0.161** 0.049 0.047 0.048 0.128 0.108 0.088  
(2.36) (2.36) (2.15) (2.77) (2.02) (2.15) (0.70) (0.68) (0.69) (1.37) (1.08) (0.74) 
𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 
 
0.011 −0.021 −0.021 −0.024 0.034 
 
−0.061 −0.074 −0.027 0.075 0.074   
(0.16) (− 0.29) (− 0.24) (− 0.24) (0.33) 
 
(− 0.62) (− 0.75) (− 0.22) (0.52) (0.46) 
𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 
  
0.371*** 0.409** 0.385 0.298 
  
0.205 0.348 0.273 0.350    
(2.66) (2.57) (2.18) (1.61) 
  
(1.14) (1.54) (1.10) (1.11) 
𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 
   
0.329 0.249 0.220 
   
−0.060 0.028 −0.203     
(1.39) (0.92) (0.89) 
   
(− 0.21) (0.08) (− 0.52) 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−1 
    
0.008 0.010 
    
−0.020 −0.018      
(1.19) (1.37) 
    
(− 1.05) (− 0.82) 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙)𝑡𝑡−1 
     
−0.283** 
     
0.023       
(− 3.91) 
     
(0.26) 
𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 
     
0.237 
     
−0.144       
(1.38) 
     
(− 0.64) 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 
     
−0.491* 
     
0.133       
(− 1.80) 
     
(0.31) 
𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 
     
−0.210 
     
−0.186       
(− 1.18) 
     
(− 0.89) 
𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 
     
0.038 
     
0.127       
(0.47) 
     
(1.13) 
𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 
     
0.045 
     
0.005       
(0.35) 
     
(0.03) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No 
Firm FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,836 12,836 12,836 8,037 6,119 4,938 12,836 12,836 12,836 8,037 6,119 4,938 
Adj. R2 0.610 0.610 0.611 0.627 0.605 0.611 0.719 0.719 0.719 0.735 0.731 0.731 
Notes: This table presents results of OLS regressions with additional control variables. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is relative idiosyncratic risk measured as Ln([1 − 𝐶𝐶2]/𝐶𝐶2). We 
include proxies from board characteristics and managerial ownership: 𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒 (the number of board members), 𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 (the ratio of number of 
independent directors to board size), 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 (the percentage of female directors on board) and 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 (the percent of CEO ownership). 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺 is governance index, which is based on 24 antitakeover provisions. We also add different proxies for the presence of institutional investors: 
𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙 (the number of institutional shareholders in a firm-year), 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 (the ownership held by dedicated institutional investors), 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 (local 
institutional ownership, where local institutions are defined as the institutions’ headquarters located within 150 miles of a firm's headquarters) and 
𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 (the ownership held by independent institutional investors). 𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 is ownership held by institutions whose ownership is above 5%. 
𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 is ownership held by corporate insiders. Insiders are defined as a chief executive officer, other executive officers, and directors. Detailed 
definitions of other variables are listed in Appendix A. Industry, firm, year dummies and other firm level controls used in Table  are included, but 
coefficient estimates are omitted to save space. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standard errors adjusted by heteroskedasticity 
and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
  
It might be the case that shareholder coordination is merely a variation of other forms of institutional ownership 
such as number of institutional investors. Thus, we first add number of institutional investors (𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙)) to 
our baseline regression. We also control ownership by dedicated institutions (𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙) as they are important 
drivers of effective monitoring of managers. Gaspar and Massa (2007) find that local institutional investors, who 
are geographically proximate to a firm's headquarters, are active in shaping corporate governance due to their 
private information advantage. Similarly, Ayers et al. (2011) find local monitoring institutional investors are 
effective at constraining earnings management and enhancing corporate disclosure quality. If local institutional 
investors are effective monitors of corporate behavior, it is likely that the relation between shareholder 
coordination and price informativeness is driven mainly by local institutions. Thus, we control for local 
institutional ownership (𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙) in the baseline regression. As independent institutional investors are also 
important players in promoting corporate transparency, we also control ownership by independent institutional 
investors (𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙). Brockman and Yan (2009) find that stock prices of firms with higher blockholder 
ownership are more informative. We also examine whether our results are driven by blockholder ownership 
(𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙). Evidence on the role of insiders shows a positive relation between insider trading and idiosyncratic 
volatility (e.g., Piotroski & Roulstone, 2004). Therefore, we control insider ownership (𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙) to augment 
the baseline model. The results are reported in columns (5)–(6) and (11)–(12) of Table 6. 
Results reported in Table 6 show that our results hold with some exceptions: in columns (10)–(12), results for 
regression models with firm fixed effects are still positive but insignificant. Several reasons contribute to the 
disappearance of significance. First, the design of the coordination measure is to capture the relatively stable 
connection among institutional investors over time. If our shareholder coordination truly captures relatively 
stable connection among institutional investors, including firm fixed effects would definitely absorb at least 
some of the effects coming from shareholder coordination. Second, the inclusion of additional variables 
significantly decreases our sample size. We lose nearly 58% of observations (from 19,028 to 8,037). Third, 
adding a variety of other governance variables would cause multicollinearity problems. One of the features of 
multicollinearity is that the standard errors of the affected coefficients tend to be large (e.g., Kumar, 1975). As a 
result, the test of the hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero may lead to a failure to reject a false null 
hypothesis of no effect of the interested variable, a type II error. Moreover, sample size is an import factor in 
determining the degree of multicollinearity (e.g., Farrar & Glauber, 1967). The severity of multicollinearity could 
be mitigated in the presence of large sample size. As our sample size significantly decreases, the effect of 
multicollinearity is magnified. 
However, the alternative explanation for the insignificance is that shareholder coordination is merely a proxy for 
the quality of the firm's corporate governance structure. The insignificant coefficient is due to the addition of 
other relevant governance structure variables. We admit that we cannot completely rule out the possibility that 
shareholder coordination could capture some latent governance structure variable, leading to the insignificance 
once other governance structure variables are included. Therefore, we advise readers to interpret the results 
with caution. 
Establishing causality 
As reverse causality can be a serious concern, the results so far do not allow us to draw a strong conclusion 
regarding the relation between shareholder coordination and stock price informativeness. It is possible that 
institutional investors do not invest randomly, so that what we label the ‘shareholder coordination effect’ may 
just be a reflection of preferences by geographically clustered institutions favoring firms with stronger stock 
price informativeness. To address this concern, in this subsection we perform two tests to provide evidence on 
the direction of causality. 
First, we follow Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012) by adding current and lead shareholder coordination into the 
baseline regression model (equation ) to examine how stock price informativeness is related to lagged, current, 
and lead shareholder coordination: 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  =  𝛽𝛽0  +  𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  +  𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1  +  𝛽𝛽4𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
 𝛽𝛽5𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛽𝛽6𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  + 𝛽𝛽7𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛽𝛽8𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆. (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +
 𝛽𝛽9𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛽𝛽10𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛽𝛽11𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  + 𝛽𝛽12𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +
 𝛽𝛽13𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛽𝛽14𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗  +  𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , (6) 
In equation (6), 𝛽𝛽1, 𝛽𝛽2, and 𝛽𝛽3 capture the relation between stock price informativeness and lagged, current, 
and lead shareholder coordination, respectively. If shareholder coordination improves stock price 
informativeness, then we would expect 𝛽𝛽1 >  0. Conversely, if reverse causality explains our findings, we should 
find 𝛽𝛽3 >  0. Evidence of 𝛽𝛽2 >  0 would be consistent with the simultaneity explanation. Panel A of Table 7 
reports the results from estimating equation (6). The coefficient estimates of control variables are omitted for 
brevity. The results are consistent with the notion that the direction of the positive effect is from shareholder 
coordination to stock price informativeness, not vice versa. For example, in column ( 2) of Table 7 Panel A, 𝛽𝛽1 is 
equal to 0.071 and significant at the 5% level. In contrast, and inconsistent with the reverse causality 
explanation, we find that 𝛽𝛽2 and 𝛽𝛽3 are insignificant or significant with unexpected sign. One exception is that in 
column (1) of Table 7 Panel A, 𝛽𝛽2 is significant and positive, indicating weak evidence supporting the 
simultaneity explanation. However, as indicated in column (2) of Table 7 Panel A, 𝛽𝛽2 becomes insignificant once 
we control for firm fixed effects rather than industry fixed effects. 
Table 7 Reverse causality 
  (1) (2)  
 









COORDt 0.083** −0.019 
  
 
(2.02) (− 0.37) 
  










Firm Controls Yes Yes 
  
Year FE & Industry FE Yes No 
  
Year FE & Firm FE No Yes 
  
Observations 10,008 10,008 
  
Adj. R2 0.608 0.763 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel B: Change-on-change Analysis     
 𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝐭𝐭  𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝐭𝐭  







−0.003 −0.005    
(− 0.95) (− 1.36) 
ΔTotownt−1 0.078 0.333*** 0.073*** 0.107***  
(0.80) (2.85) (2.35) (2.73) 
ΔLn(Assets)t−1 −0.170*** −0.118*** 0.044*** 0.050*** 
 
(− 5.75) (− 3.23) (4.40) (3.99) 
ΔLn(MB)t−1 −0.258*** −0.248*** 0.009 0.012*  
(− 14.86) (− 12.60) (1.54) (1.89) 
ΔROEt−1 −0.060*** −0.061*** 0.004 0.005  
(− 3.07) (− 2.75) (0.41) (0.51) 
ΔStd. (ROE)t−1 0.018 0.014 −0.001 −0.002  
(1.33) (0.84) (− 0.31) (− 0.40) 
ΔLeveraget−1 0.311 0.233 0.019 0.009  
(3.42) (2.18) (0.67) (0.29) 
ΔLn(FirmAge)t−1 −0.470*** −1.230*** 0.066** −0.053  
(− 5.49) (− 5.42) (2.09) (− 0.64) 
ΔDivDumt−1 0.011 −0.004 −0.009 −0.017  
(0.28) (− 0.08) (− 0.74) (− 1.30) 
ΔMultiSegt−1 −0.012 −0.013 0.009 0.010  
(− 0.25) (− 0.24) (0.69) (0.66) 
ΔIn(DistHQ)t−1 0.551 0.554 −0.174 −0.225  
(1.02) (0.86) (− 1.07) (− 1.13) 
ΔLn(Analyst)t+1 −0.040** −0.023 −0.025*** −0.014  
(− 2.07) (− 1.03) (− 3.17) (− 1.60) 
Constant −0.010 0.001 −0.011 0.006  
(− 0.90) (1.02) (− 0.35) (0.15) 
Year FE & Industry FE Yes No Yes No 
Year FE & Firm FE No Yes No Yes 
Observations 15,999 15,999 11,701 11,701 
Adj. R2 0.195 0.138 0.024 0.136 
Notes: This table presents results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the proxy for stock price 
informativeness, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is relative idiosyncratic risk measured as Ln([1 − 𝐶𝐶2]/𝐶𝐶2). Panel A includes the lead 
and contemporary weighted average distance among institutional shareholders, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1 and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡. Panel 
B report results of the change-on-change regression. Panel C reports the results of GMM analysis. Detailed 
definitions of other variables are listed in Appendix A. Industry, firm, and year dummies are included, but omit 
coefficients to save space. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standard errors adjusted by 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
In our second test, we adopt the change-on-change method that has been widely used in the literature (e.g., 
Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, & Matos, 2011; Chhaochharia et al., 2012). If the degree of shareholder coordination 
has a significant influence on stock price informativeness as our results imply, then as shareholder coordination 
increases over time, we would expect to see corresponding increases in stock price informativeness. If causality 
runs only in this direction, then increases in stock price informativeness should not drive increases in 
shareholder coordination. 
To run the change-on-change regression model, we first replace the dependent variable 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 at t with the change 
in 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 from 𝑙𝑙 − 1 to 𝑙𝑙 (∆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼). Then we obtain the change in all control variables from 𝑙𝑙 − 2 to 𝑙𝑙 − 1. The 
regression model is redefined as follows: 
Δ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  =  𝛽𝛽0  +  𝛽𝛽1Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛽𝛽2Δ𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛽𝛽3Δ𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +
 𝛽𝛽4Δ𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛽𝛽5Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  + 𝛽𝛽6Δ𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆. (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛽𝛽7Δ𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +
 𝛽𝛽8Δ𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛽𝛽9Δ𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝛽10Δ𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝛽11Δ𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛽𝛽12Δ𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗  +  𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , (7) 
To examine whether the reverse causality exists, we use Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 as the dependent variable and ∆IV as the 
main independent variable of interest. Other control variables remain the same. More specifically, we run the 
following model: 
Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  =  𝛼𝛼0  +  𝛼𝛼1Δ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛼𝛼2Δ𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛼𝛼3Δ𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +
 𝛼𝛼4Δ𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛼𝛼5Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  + 𝛼𝛼6Δ𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆. (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛼𝛼7Δ𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +
 𝛼𝛼8Δ𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛼𝛼9Δ𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  + 𝛼𝛼10Δ𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +
 𝛼𝛼11Δ𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛼𝛼12Δ𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗  +  𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , (8) 
We are particularly interested in the estimate of 𝛽𝛽1 in equation (7) and 𝛼𝛼1 in equation. A positive and significant 
𝛽𝛽1 and insignificant 𝛼𝛼1 would warrant that the relation between shareholder coordination and stock price 
informativeness is not bi-directional. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 Panel B report the results for regression models with changes in price 
informativeness as the dependent variable and lagged changes in shareholder coordination as the main 
independent variable, while columns (3) and (4) reports results with regressions with changes in coordination as 
the dependent variable and lagged changes in price informativeness as the main independent variable. In 
column (1) of Table 7 Panel B, 𝛽𝛽1 is equal to 0.085 and significant at the 1% level. In contrast, in columns (3) and 
(4), the coefficient estimates on the change in idiosyncratic volatility (Δ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) are not statistically significant, 
indicating that changes in stock price informativeness do not have any effect on subsequent changes in 
shareholder coordination. This evidence indicates that the causal link from shareholder coordination to stock 
price informativeness is considerably stronger than the reverse causal relation. 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
To solidify our findings, we perform a couple of robustness checks in this subsection. First, institutional investors 
are highly geographically clustered. To address the concern that our results could be driven by institutions in 
particular metropolitan areas such as New York and Boston, we reconstruct coordination measures without 
institutions in above two metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). We choose these two MSAs because they 
dominate the landscape of institutional investors. The results in Panel A of Table 8 show that our results 
continue to hold. 
 
Table 8 Robustness checks  
(1) (2) 
Panel A: No NYC & Boston 
  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 0.081*** 0.066***  
(5.81) (4.70) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE & Industry FE Yes No 
Year FE & Firm FE No Yes 
Observations 19,028 19,028 
Adj. R2 0.644 0.735 
Panel B: Control Prior Connection   
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 0.009*** 0.008** 
 
(3.08) (2.35) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE & Industry FE Yes No 
Year FE & Firm FE No Yes 
Observations 19,028 19,028 
Adj. R2 0.530 0.696 
Panel C: PIN   
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 0.019*** 0.015***  
(4.44) (3.66) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE & Industry FE Yes No 
Year FE & Firm FE No Yes 
Observations 19,028 19,028 
Adj. R2 0.492 0.643 
Notes: This table reports three sets of robustness checks. In Panel A, we reconstruct 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 without 
institutions located in New York and Boston and rerun the baseline regression. In Panel B, we control the proxy 
designed to capture the prior connection via other shareholdings in other firms. In Panel C, we use 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃 as an 
alternative variable for stock price informativeness. Detailed definitions of other variables are listed in Appendix 
A. Industry, firm, year dummies and other firm characteristics used in Table 3 are included, but omit coefficients 
to save space. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standard errors adjusted by 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Do prior connections among institutional shareholders drive our results? In other words, is the variable (COORD) 
capturing prior connections or merely geographical proximity? To answer this question, drawing from the 
literature, we devise a measure, weighted average correlation between institutions’ portfolios of stock holdings, 
to proxy for connections among institutions. The intuition behind this measure is based on the premise that 
institutions with similar portfolio allocations are more likely to share common investment philosophies and 
therefore are also more likely to have developed connections. Pareek (2012) classifies mutual managers who 
have large common portions in their portfolios as informationally connected. He also finds that mutual funds 
trade together with other funds in their information network and the effect cannot be explained by style 
invested and geographic location. The results in Panel B of Table 8 show that after controlling the connection 
proxy, the coefficient estimate of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is still positive and significant but of a smaller magnitude, suggesting 
that 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 captures prior connections in common and beyond. Moreover, Pantzalis and Wang (2017) find that 
shareholder coordination proxied by 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 acts as an information diffusion channel and causes a lead-lag 
relation in stock returns between firms with high shareholder coordination (strong connection or network) and 
firms with low shareholder coordination (weak connection or network). Their findings are consistent with the 
notion that 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 captures prior connections rather than merely geographic proximity. In short, evidence in 
Panel B of Table 8 and the literature suggest that rather than merely reflect geographic proximity among 
institutional investors, our shareholder coordination measure (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) captures strength of connections 
evolving over time. 
In Panel C of Table 8, we use the alternative measure of stock price informativeness (𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃) as the dependent 
variable and rerun the baseline model. The results indicate that shareholder coordination still has a positive 
impact on price informativeness. 
To further address the endogeneity concern, we conduct the dynamic panel generalized-method-of-moments 
(GMM) analysis. GMM dynamic panel estimation is robust to endogeneity problems due to reverse causality, 
simultaneity, and unobserved heterogeneity (Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012). Appendix shows that our results 
continue to hold. We find that COORD is significantly and positively related to price informativeness. Noticeably, 
the GMM coefficient estimate (0.469) is much larger than the OLS coefficient estimate (0.106), which could be 
due to a reduction in measurement error. Appendix shows the results of AR(1) and AR(2) tests of the null 
hypothesis of no first or second order serial correlation, respectively. For our GMM estimates, if the 
assumptions of our specification are valid, by construction the residuals in first differences (AR(1)) should be 
correlated, but there should be no serial correlation in second differences (AR(2)). Results of these tests confirm 
that this is the case: the AR(1) test yields a 𝐼𝐼-value of <0.01 and the AR(2) test yields a 𝐼𝐼-value of 0.452. 
Additionally, the Hansen test suggests that the instruments are valid (𝐼𝐼-value = 0.361). 
A POSSIBLE CHANNEL 
In this section, we explore a possible channel through which shareholder coordination affects stock price 
informativeness. Using the AIMR-FAF annual corporate disclosure ratings, Gelb and Zarowin (2002) find that 
greater disclosure is associated with stock prices that are more informative about future earnings. Haggard et al. 
(2008) find that enhanced voluntary disclosure increases stock price non-synchronicity. Higher disclosure quality 
implies more accurate firm-specific information is released to the public. The decreased information uncertainty 
would create more incentives for investors to collect and trade on private information. Therefore, a high level of 
shareholder coordination can influence stock price informativeness by improving corporate disclosure quality. 
To examine whether firms with a high level of shareholder coordination are associated with high disclosure 
quality, we elect the frequency of management earnings forecasts to proxy for corporate disclosure quality.[9] 
Management earnings forecast has been widely used in the literature to capture the extent of voluntary 
disclosure (e.g., Bamber & Cheon, 1998). Drawing from the literature (e.g., Ajinkya, Bhojraj, & Sengupta, 2005), 
we design the regression model below: 
𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  =  𝛾𝛾0  +  𝛾𝛾1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛾𝛾2𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛾𝛾3𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +
 𝐿𝐿4𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛾𝛾5𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  + 𝛾𝛾6𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛾𝛾7𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +
 𝛾𝛾8𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛾𝛾9𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴_𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛾𝛾10𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  + 𝛾𝛾11𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
 𝛾𝛾12𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝛾𝛾13𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗  +  𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , (9) 
 
We control firm size (𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴)) because prior literature document a positive relation between firm size and 
management earnings forecasts. Institutional ownership (𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙) is also controlled as literature provides 
evidence in support of the monitoring role of institutional investors in enhancing corporate transparency (Chen 
et al., 2007). Bamber and Cheon (1998) show that proprietary cost is related to management earnings forecasts. 
Following the literature, here we use market-to-book ratio as a proxy to control it. Prior research (e.g., Lang & 
Lundholm, 1993) find that firms using Big 5 auditors tend to have better disclosure. Thus we include Auditor to 
capture the effect of top auditors on management earnings forecasts. 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟 is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if a firm uses one of the Big 5 auditors in that year, and 0 otherwise. Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1994) find 
that shareholder litigation affects corporate disclosure quality. Therefore we add to our model 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙, 
which equals 1 if a firms fall into an industry that is more vulnerable to shareholder litigation, and 0 otherwise. 
Management's ability to forecast earnings would be circumscribed for firms making losses (e.g., Hayn, 1995). So 
we include the dummy variable, 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, which equals 1 if the firm reported losses, and 0 otherwise. Analyst 
forecast dispersion would make it more difficult for managers to forecast earnings. Therefore, we control 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟, the standard deviation of analyst forecasts, in the regression model. We also control for analyst 
coverage (𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙)) to account for the fact that analyst coverage is associated with corporate disclosure 
quality. Literature has documented that the direction of earnings changes and earnings volatility are related to 
management earnings forecast (e.g., Ajinkya et al., 2005; Waymire, 1985). Thus we include an earnings dummy 
(𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴_𝐶𝐶) and earnings volatility (𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙) in our regression model. Beta is added to control for market 
risk. Heflin, Subramanyam, and Zhang (2003) find that managers issue more earnings forecasts after Regulation 
FD. So our last control variable in our channel test model is 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶, a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm-year 
observation falls after year 2000, and 0 otherwise. 
Our results in Panel A of Table 9 indicate that shareholder coordination has a positive impact on the frequency 
of management earnings forecasts. Our results also suggest that shareholder coordination can directly improve 
corporate disclosure quality by well-coordinated monitoring effort and enhanced monitoring efficacy. Moreover, 
the positive relation between shareholder coordination and the frequency of management earnings forecasts is 
driven primarily by firms of relatively larger size, indicating that shareholder coordination affects voluntary 
disclosure differently for firms of different sizes. Panel B of Table 9 also shows the effect of shareholder 
coordination on stock price informativeness after controlling for management earnings forecasts. It is 
noteworthy that earnings forecast itself is significant in all regressions, indicating that voluntary disclosure is 
significantly positively associated with stock price informativeness. What's more important is that, although 
shareholder coordination is significant with expected sign in all regressions, the positive relation between 
shareholder coordination and price informativeness is much stronger and more significant in firms of small 
size.[10] The implication of our results is that for large firms, shareholder coordination enhances price 
informativeness mainly by inducing managers to increase value-relevant voluntary disclosures; for small firms, 
shareholder coordination affects price informativeness by facilitating price information collection and 
incorporation. 
Table 9 The possible channel  
(1) (2) (3)  
Full Sample Large Firms Small Firms 
Panel A: Forecast Frequency 
   
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 0.184** 0.269* 0.021  
(2.31) (1.78) (0.27) 
𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 0.497*** 0.468 0.774***  
(2.88) (1.52) (4.26) 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴)𝑡𝑡−1 0.236*** 0.289*** 0.084  
(7.51) (4.83) (1.58) 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡−1 0.172*** 0.162** 0.098*  
(3.51) (2.14) (1.94) 
𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−1 0.020 −0.394 0.069  
(0.19) (− 2.01) (0.58) 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 0.142*** 0.024 0.235***  
(2.75) (0.33) (3.44) 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1 −0.046 −0.287 0.138  
(− 0.33) (− 1.15) (0.89) 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−1 −0.558*** −0.507*** −0.546***  
(− 9.73) (− 5.26) (− 8.30) 
𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴_𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 −1.592 −6.130*** −0.586  
(− 1.55) (− 4.85) (− 1.01) 
𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 −0.067** −0.113** −0.031  
(− 1.99) (− 2.31) (− 0.74) 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙)𝑡𝑡−1 0.000*** 0.000** −0.004***  
(3.18) (2.39) (− 2.93) 
𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 −0.479*** −0.571*** −0.305*** 
 
(− 9.76) (− 6.44) (− 5.77) 
𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 −0.134 −0.326 0.146  
(− 1.17) (− 1.77) (1.07) 
Constant −2.888*** −3.497*** −1.370**  
(− 5.36) (− 3.14) (− 2.41) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,239 8,094 8,145 
Adj. 𝐶𝐶2 0.256 0.284 0.232 
Panel B: 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒕𝒕    
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 0.158*** 0.079* 0.170***  
(4.34) (1.69) (3.68) 
𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1 0.020*** 0.010** 0.018***  
(4.64) (2.13) (2.91) 
𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 −0.583*** −0.291*** −0.375***  
(− 9.38) (− 3.08) (− 4.93) 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴)𝑡𝑡−1 −0.349*** −0.295*** −0.509***  
(− 27.72) (− 13.99) (− 20.90) 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡−1 −0.424*** −0.355*** −0.505***  
(− 24.28) (− 14.78) (− 22.15) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 −0.045** −0.072** −0.044  
(− 2.07) (− 2.42) (− 1.57) 
𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆. (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸)𝑡𝑡−1 0.057*** 0.067*** 0.049***  
(5.90) (4.44) (4.60) 
𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 0.924*** 0.981*** 1.087***  
(13.54) (10.19) (12.32) 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒)𝑡𝑡−1 −0.033* −0.050** −0.007  
(− 1.68) (− 1.99) (− 0.28) 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡−1 −0.039 −0.029 −0.033  
(− 1.52) (− 0.90) (− 1.01) 
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 −0.018 −0.013 −0.025  
(− 0.44) (− 0.27) (− 0.40) 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡−1 −0.151 −0.240* −0.187  
(− 1.40) (− 1.78) (− 1.31) 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙)𝑡𝑡−1 −0.181*** −0.107*** −0.199***  
(− 9.77) (− 4.70) (− 7.68) 
Constant 7.145*** 5.349*** 8.216***  
(21.66) (11.61) (19.15) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 19,028 9,492 9,536 
Adj. R2 0.644 0.566 0.587 
Notes: This table reports the results of the channel test. Large/Small firms are classified based on the median 
value. Panel A presents results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the frequency of 
management earnings forecasts. Panel B reports the results of the coordination-informativeness relation test 
after including the frequency of management earnings forecasts as a control variable. Detailed definitions of 
other variables are listed in Appendix A. Industry and year dummies are included, but omit coefficients to save 
space. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standard errors adjusted by heteroskedasticity 
and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
To further bolster our findings in the channel test, we provide additional evidence by showing that shareholder 
coordination also positively affects two alternative measures of voluntary disclosure (management forecast 
occurrence and forecast precision).[11] Overall, our results suggest that shareholder coordination affects price 
informativeness through enhancing corporate disclosure quality. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Although the role of institutional investors in improving corporate transparency has been recognized by many 
prior studies, the question of whether coordination among institutional shareholders can improve the corporate 
information environment has not been fully answered. In this paper, we demonstrate that shareholder 
coordination has implications for stock price informativeness. We use geographic proximity between 
institutional investors as the basis for designing the measure of shareholder coordination. We find that a higher 
degree of shareholder coordination is associated with more informative stock prices. The positive relation 
between shareholder coordination and price informativeness stands up to a variety of endogeneity tests and 
robustness checks. We also find that shareholder coordination plays a more important role when alternative 
governance mechanisms are weak, suggesting that there is a substitution effect between shareholder 
coordination and the existing governance mechanisms. We also propose a possible channel through which 
shareholder coordination can affect stock price informativeness. Taken together, our results support the notion 
that shareholder coordination improves stock price informativeness. 
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Notes 
1 For example, Lewellen (2011) documents that institutions in the 13F database held32% of total market value 
at the beginning in 1980. The number increases to 68% by the end of 2007. 
2 For example, in our sample, the number of institutions holding an average stock is 41 in 1994, but the number 
increases to 131 in 2010. 
3 Geographic proximity has been shown to be influential in the development of close relationships such as 
dealings among floor traders (Baker, 1984), the forming of interlocked corporate boards (Kono, Palmer, 
Friedland, & Zafonte, 1998), and investment patterns of venture capital firms (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). 
Finance literature has also shown that geographic proximity facilitates communication and the exchange 
of ideas among mutual fund managers (e.g., Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001; Hong, Kubik, & Stein, 2005; 
Ivković &Weisbenner, 2005). Therefore, geographic proximity among institutional shareholders is a 
legitimate proxy for shareholder coordination. 
4 Idiosyncratic volatility and probability of informed trading have been widely used as proxies for stock price 
informativeness in the literature (e.g., Ferreira & Laux, 2007; Ferreira, Ferreira, & Raposo, 2011). 
5 Bushee (1998) finds that the investment horizon of institutional investors is positively associated with a firm's 
R&D spending that could create long-term value. Brickley et al. (1988) show that independent 
institutional investors aremore likely to pass proposals on antitakeover amendments. 
6 Corporate governance mechanisms can generally be classified into two categories: internal and external 
governance mechanisms. Large shareholders and board directors are often viewed as the main internal 
governance mechanisms (e.g., Franks & Mayer, 1996), while takeovers and the market for corporate 
control are the main external governance mechanisms (e.g., Jensen, 1993).We view shareholder 
coordination as the internal governance mechanism in that if institutional investors can coordinate with 
ease, they can form a coalition and perform the role of large shareholders to mitigate the free-rider 
problem in corporate monitoring. 
7 We thank Brian Bushee for generously providing the institutional investor classification data. 
8 In the following regression analysis, we take the simple average of shareholder coordination over the four 
quarters in the past year, t−1. 
9 AIMR-FAF rating data is available up to 1995 but our sample begins in 1994. In addition, one limitation with 
AIMR-FAF ratings, as Healy and Palepu (2001) point out, is that ‘it is unclear whether the analysts on the 
AIMR panels take the ratings seriously, how they select firms to be included in the ratings, and what 
biases they bring to the ratings.’ 
10 The cross-equation coefficient equality test indicates that the difference between the two coefficients on 
shareholder coordination is significant at the 5% level. 
11 The results are not tabulated but available upon request. 
 
APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES  
IV Annual logistic transformed relative volatility estimated from the 
Fama-French three factor model. [Data source: CRSP] 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 The inverse of the average of log(1 + weighted-average geographic 
distance between institutional shareholders of the firm) in each firm-
quarter in year 𝑙𝑙 − 1, where weight is the ratio of ownership held by 
institution 𝑖𝑖 to the total ownership held by all institutions in a firm at 
quarter q. [Data source: Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings 
(F13)] 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 Institutional shareholder coordination measured among independent 
institutions (mutual funds and independent investment advisors). 
[Data source: Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (F13)] 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺 Institutional shareholder coordination measured among grey 
institutions (bank trusts, insurance companies, and other institutions). 
[Data source: Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (F13)] 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 Institutional shareholder coordination measured among dedicated 
institutions (e.g. Bushee, 2001). [Data source: Thomson-Reuters 
Institutional Holdings (F13)] 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 Institutional shareholder coordination measured among transient 
institutions (e.g. Bushee, 2001). [Data source: Thomson-Reuters 
Institutional Holdings (F13)] 
𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 The average percentage of aggregated share holdings by institutional 
investors to total shares outstanding in year t−1. [Data source: 
Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (F13)] 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴) Natural logarithm of total assets. [Data source: Compustat] 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀) Natural logarithm of the market-to-book ratio. [Data source: 
Compustat] 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 Return on equity, calculated as earnings before extraordinary items 
divided by book value of equity by the end of prior year. [Data source: 
Compustat] 
𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆. (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸) Standard deviation of ROE during the past 3 years. [Data source: 
Compustat] 
𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 Leverage, defined as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. [Data 
source: Compustat] 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒) Natural logarithm of firm age, defined as the number of years since 
the stock was included in the Compustat database. [Data source: 
Compustat] 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 Dividend dummy, which equals 1 if the firm pays dividends, and 0 
otherwise. [Data source: Compustat] 
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 Diversification dummy which equals 1 when a firm operates in 
multiple segments, and 0 otherwise. [Data source: Compustat] 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) The weighted average distance between institutions and a firm's 
headquarters. 
𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙 Natural logarithm of number of analysts following the firm in a year. 
[Data source: I/B/E/S] 
𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙 The number of institutional shareholders in a firm-year. [Data source: 
Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (F13)] 
𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 Ownership held by dedicated institutions. [Data source: Thomson-
Reuters Institutional Holdings (F13)] 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 Ownership held by institutions located within 150 mile radius of a 
firm's headquarters. [Data source: Thomson-Reuters Institutional 
Holdings (F13)] 
𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 Ownership held by independent institutional investors. [Data source: 
Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (F13)] 
𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 Ownership held by institutions whose ownership is above 5%. [Data 
source: Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (F13)] 
𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 Ownership held by corporate insiders. Insiders are defined as a chief 
executive officer, other executive officers, and directors. [Data 
source: Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC)] 
𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒 The number of board members. [Data source: CDA/Spectrum 
Compact Disclosure and Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC)] 
𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 Ratio of number of independent directors to board size. [Data source: 
CDA/Spectrum Compact Disclosure and Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC)] 
𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 The percentage of female directors on the board. [Data source: 
CDA/Spectrum Compact Disclosure and Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC)] 
𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 The percent of CEO ownership. [Data source: ExecuComp] 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺 Governance index, which is based on 24 antitakeover provisions [Data 
source: Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC)] 
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃 The probability of informed trading. [Data source:  
https://scholar.rhsmith.umd.edu/sbrown/pindata]. 
𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 Total number of earnings forecasts issued by a firm per year. [Data 
source: First Call] 
𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟 A dummy that equals1 if the company is audited by one of the Big 5 
auditors, and 0 otherwise. [Data source: Compustat] 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 A dummy that equals 1 for all firms in the biotechnology (2833–2836 
and 8731–8734), computers (3570–3577 and 7370–7374), electronics 
(3600–3674), and retail (5200–5961) industries, and 0 otherwise. 
[Data source: Compustat] 
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 A dummy that equals 1 if the firm reported losses in the current 
period, and 0 otherwise. [Data source: Compustat] 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟 Standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts divided by the median 
forecast. [Data source: I/B/E/S] 
𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴_𝐶𝐶 A dummy that equals 1 if the current-period EPS is greater than or 
equal to the previous-period EPS, and 0 otherwise. [Data source: 
Compustat] 
𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 Standard deviation of the operating earnings in the last five years. 
[Data source: Compustat] 
𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 Market risk derived from a one-factor market model using daily stock 
return data. [Data source: CRSP] 
𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 A dummy that equals 1 if a firm-year observation is after 2000, and 0 
otherwise. [Data source: Compustat] 
 
APPENDIX B: GMM ANALYSIS 
This table reports estimation results from the dynamic panel GMM estimation method. The dependent variable 
is a proxy for stock price informativeness; IV is relative idiosyncratic risk measured as Ln([1 − 𝐶𝐶2]/𝐶𝐶2). 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 
is the weighted average distances among institutional shareholders and multiplied by −1. All variable definitions 
are given in Appendix A. Industry (i.e., the first two-digit SIC code), firm, and year dummies are included, but 
coefficient estimates are omitted to save space. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using 
standard errors adjusted by heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate a two-




































































𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟 𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸  Yes 
𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸  Yes 
𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴  11,701 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶(1)  <0.01 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶(2)  0.452 
Hansen  0.361 
 
 
